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1  Introduction  
1.1 Background  
 
The atrocities of World War II urged the international community to adopt several 
multilateral conventions for the purpose of criminalizing specific acts and providing for 
the accountability of their perpetrators, but the procedural rules governing the allocation 
of criminal jurisdiction remained unelaborated upon.  Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals, save for few sporadic cases, there were neither international nor national 
prosecutions of the proscribed acts. The establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia1, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda2 
and the International Criminal Court3coupled with the exercise by few states of various 
forms of extraterritorial and rarely universal jurisdiction in highly sensitive cases has 
given the debate over the principle of universal jurisdiction further impetus.  
 
1  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, UN 
Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163 app.1192 (1993) [hereinafter the ICTY]. 
France has enacted a special law to govern the co-operation with the ICTY and the ICTR, the laws confer 
on the French courts for all the crimes falling with the cognizance of the tribunals. Luc Reydams, 
Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives. Oxford University press 
(2003).p.133. 
2  Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.SCOR, 49th Sess.,3453rd mtg., Annex, at 3, 
U.N.Doc. s/Res/955 (1994) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598,1602 (1994)[hereinafter the ICTR]. 
3  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,1998,UN Doc.A/CONF.183/9,37 
I.L.M.1998.[hereinafter the ICC].  To meet the complemetarity jurisdiction of the ICC, Germany enacted 
a national code of Crimes Against International Law(VStGB) entered into force ON 30 June 2002 , ibid.., 
p. 144. For the same purpose The Netherlands enacted the Act of 19 June 2003 (International Crimes 
Act), an English translation available at: 
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=48969E53AB41497BB614E6E9EAABF9E0X3X3
5905X73- (last visited 08.06.2006). 
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Owing to its nature the universality principle is a complex and controversial one, for it 
ultimately relies on the expansion of a state’s national criminal jurisdiction to adjudicate 
enumerated  international crimes committed outside its territory by and against non-
national and without any actual or legal link to or effect on the enforcing state. Since 
international crimes are often committed in pursuance and execution of state policy.4 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction, therefore, entails the adjudication of another 
state’s high ranking officials which might be considered as affront to the latter’s 
sovereignty. 
 
The debate over the principle has been dominated by the discussion of its merits and 
drawbacks. Human rights5 activists consider the principle, among other mechanisms, as 
an indispensable tool to vindicate human rights and combat impunity of their violators 
in the international arena, therefore, their normative discussion focuses mainly on the 
doctrine’s desirability and role to achieve these noble goals. To confirm the principle’s 
availability, they often cite a set of judicial pronouncement where the universality 
principle was dealt with. 
 
In stark contrast, other scholars and statesmen focus on its controversial relationship 
with other deep- rooted institutions of international law, namely the equal sovereignty 
of states and its corollary the non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
sovereigns6. They denigrate the principle by emphasizing its pitfalls and its ability to 
disrupt international order and to endanger international peace7. 
 
4  The Nazi regime, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Pinochet in Chile, Milosevic in the Former Yugoslavia 
and The Hutu in Rwanda. 
5  See Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: The duty of states to enact and implement 
legislation’ (September 2001) AI Index: IOR53/002/2001,p.18.The organization reported that 120 states 
have provided their courts with universal jurisdiction for war crimes, crimes against humanity 100 states, 
genocide 70 states and torture(not amounting to crime against humanity) 80 states. 
6  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 ( Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
2000 I.C.J 235 ( Dec. 13, 2000) 
 available at www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm( last visited 05.05.2006) 
7  See Gene Bykhovsky, Argument Against Assertion of Universal Jurisdiction By Individual States. 21 
Wis Int’l.L.J.P.(2003).P.161. See also H. Kissinger  observing that “ [i]t would be ironic if a doctrine 
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These two schools have one common characteristic, that is, their loose use of the term 
universal to describe the assertion of jurisdiction in cases when the courts where 
actually exercising other forms of jurisdiction over extraterritorial events. 
 
The lack of a comprehensive international convention regulating the jurisdiction of 
states in criminal cases compounded by the paucity of practice left the doctrine intricate 
and under-theorized8. It is still replete of contentious questions concerning its 
theoretical bases and to what extent do states accept and practice it with regard to 
human rights related crimes. 
1.2 The subject 
The paper attempts to clarify the terminological confusion surrounding the principle and 
tries to distinguish between the universality principle and other forms of jurisdiction 
where a state is prosecuting a person present in its territory for acts he committed 
abroad. 
The thesis enquires the current status of the principle to see whether it exists as an 
established legal principle in the international law. The term universal jurisdiction is 
reserved to describe the unilateral exercise of jurisdiction over non-present individuals 
and against the objection of their national state for enumerated international crimes 
regardless of their locality, the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim and where the 
alleged crime has no affect on the interests of the prosecuting state. 
 
1.3  Organization and method 
 
The principle at question belongs to the broad area of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction. Therefore I will proceed by shortly presenting the various grounds of 
criminal jurisdiction, followed by an attempt to define the universality principle by 
 
designed to transcend the political process turns into a means to pursue political enemies rather then 
universal justice”. The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking judicial .foreign Affairs 80 (2001).p.86. 
8 Leila Nadya Sadat ‘Redefining Universal Jurisdiction’ observed that “While courts and commentators 
use the term “universal jurisdiction” repeatedly, rarely do they stop and consider its implications. Indeed, 
universal jurisdiction as a concept has been under-theorized.” (2001) New Eng L. Rev. 244 
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delineating its scope and nature. To conduct that I will illustrate how the principle 
usually portrayed in the legal literature and in some judicial pronouncements in ways 
confusing it with other heads of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Then I will explore the 
principle’s relation to the concept of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes, and its 
stand regarding the notion of state sovereignty. 
 
 After setting forth the principal question to be answered I will in chapter III examine 
the circumstances under which the principle emerged as a convenient tool to combat 
piracy, furthermore, I will analyze the pronouncements of the frequently cited 
precedents for its application, in order to establish whether there exist a historical 
evidence of its legitimacy and consequential extension beyond piracy to prosecute 
serious crimes of international humanitarian law and human rights law. 
 
Chapter VI starts with analyzing thoroughly the jurisdictional clauses of the Genocide 
Convention, the1949 Geneva conventions and the first additional protocol, to find 
whether they provide, as direct source of international law, for universal jurisdiction. By 
doing so, I will illustrate which jurisdictional grounds their drafters had conferred on 
state parties and how they construed and practiced those conventions in order to 
determine whether there is practice and opinion juris capable of evidencing a customary 
international norm entitling states to practice the principle. 
Regarding crimes against humanity there is no general convention that specifies the way 
the relevant crimes may be prosecuted, and the discussion will be confined to viewing 
state practice through the relevant case law. 
 
In the last chapter, a conclusion of the discussions in the previous chapters will 
presented, an emphasis will be placed on how the decision in the Arrest Warrant case 
will affect the exercise of the principle.  
 
The discussion will mainly focus on the penal provisions of the international treaties 
and customary international law as the principal sources of international law9 , without 
 
9  Statute of International Court of Justice, Art 38(1), 59 Stat 1055, T.S.No 993 (1945) 
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denying the significance of other subsidiary sources10. The research will be conducted 
by critically assessing the writings of some prominent legal scholars advocating the 
existence of the principle and confronting their arguments with hard rules of 
international law and case law applications, to find out whether their arguments provide 
plausible grounds to prove the existence of the principle.  
 
 
1.4 Limitations 
 
The thesis examines solely the corpus of international rules regulating the allocation and 
the legal consequences of exercising the extraterritorial jurisdiction among states 
without any reference to the efficiency or the potential pitfalls of the principle. 
 
The research is concerned only with criminal jurisdiction as opposed to civil litigation 
where the outcome of the case will be limited to restitution or compensation. 
Universal jurisdiction exercised unilaterally by municipal court in an “unaffected state” 
is the subject of the paper, and not the jurisdiction of international permanent or ad hoc 
tribunals which exercise territorial jurisdiction pursuant to the mandate entrusted to 
them by the international community 11 
 
International crimes will be used as shorthand to describe exclusively genocide, grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity. 
 
10  Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant Case, 
noted that the writings of publicists “cannot of themselves and without reference to other sources of 
international law, evidence the existence of a jurisdictional norm”. Para44. [hereinafter Joint Separate 
Opinion] 
11  L. Sadat, ibid 8, uses the term universal international jurisdiction to describe the jurisdiction of the 
international tribunals.  
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2 Definition and scope of universal jurisdiction  
 
2.1 Background  
 
Jurisdiction refers to a state’s legitimate assertion of authority to affect legal interests12, 
it might be legislative, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction.  
 
The principles relating to state jurisdiction, as the other institutions of international law 
are based on considerations of state sovereignty and its corollaries the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity and the prohibition of intervention in other states affairs13. 
Therefore jurisdiction is traditionally exercised by a state over crimes perpetrated within 
its boundaries14. 
Legislative and judicial jurisdiction coincide, a national court applies the domestic 
criminal law even when the proscribed act takes place abroad. legislative jurisdiction is 
absolutely linked to state sovereignty but not the jurisdiction to adjudicate and to 
enforce, a state may have legislative jurisdiction without having the opportunity to 
enforce it, for instance, where the act is committed abroad and the offender is not 
extraditable, or when the alleged criminal is immune under international law. 
 
12  Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law ,Tex. L Rev .vol 66 (1988).p.786. 
13 Ian Brownlie, Principles of International law, he described the international law as “the whole of the 
law could be expressed in terms of the coexistence of sovereignty” (1990 4th ed).p.288. 
14 Ibid. he observed that “the principal corollaries of state sovereignty and equality of states are (1) a 
jurisdiction, prima facia exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living there; (2) a duty 
of non- intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the dependence of 
obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor” p 285. 
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As a general rule of international law, a state could agree to permit on its territory the 
exercise of jurisdiction by another state15. 
The territoriality of state jurisdiction is the dominant form but certainly not an exclusive 
one, there exist accepted other bases of jurisdiction permitting a state to assert its 
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed outside its borders.  
   
2.2 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
Extraterritorial jurisdiction denotes “The assertion of authority by a state to affect legal 
interests of individuals whose actions occur outside the state’s territory.”16 
 
Many commentators begin the enquiry by discussing the decision of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Lotus Case in 1927. 
The court pronounced on the right of Turkey to try a French officer for the death of 
eight Turkish nationals as a result of a collision between the French steamer Lotus and 
the Turkish collier Boz-Court on the high seas. 
The underlying dispute was the French contention that in order to have jurisdiction over 
the French officer, Turkey should establish its competence on specific entitlement 
recognized by international law. Turkey on the other hand based it jurisdiction on the 
lack of international norms that prohibited such jurisdiction.  
The court concluded that there was no rule in the international law that confer exclusive 
jurisdiction on the flag state over its ships in the high seas, and decided the case on the 
basis of objective territoriality which is not prohibited by international law, since the 
damage to the Turkish ship affected the Turkish territory. 
 
 
15  Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, cited several treaties, for example, the Protocol concerning 
Frontier Control and Policing, Co-operation in Criminal Justice between the United Kingdom and France 
whereby each state is permitted to exercise jurisdiction within the territory of the other one in issues 
relating to channel tunnel between them.p.185-186. 
16 Michael. P.Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party 
States. 35 New Eng. L.Rev. (2001),p.366. 
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The Lotus decision is often cited by those defending the freedom of states to stretch 
their jurisdiction17, but they confine themselves to the passage where the court stated 
that: 
“Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the 
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts 
outside their territory, it [international law] leaves them in this respect a wide measure 
of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other 
cases, every state remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most 
suitable.”18  
They deduce from this passage that unless it is prohibited by an identifiable rule of 
international law, stats are free to exercise any form of jurisdiction. This reading could 
lead to the conclusion that all innovative bases of jurisdiction would be permissible 
because since being new there would be no rule against them.19 
This contradicts the gist of the Lotus decision because after the above cited passage the 
court proceeded by raising the question of:  
“Whether the foregoing considerations really apply as regards criminal jurisdiction”20 
It then ruled that either this might be the answer, or alternatively, that: 
“[t]he exclusively territorial character of law relating to this domain constitutes a 
principle which, except as otherwise expressly provided, would, ipso facto, prevent 
states from extending the criminal jurisdiction of their courts beyond their frontiers”21 
It becomes apparent that the Lotus decision may not sustain the proposition that absent 
a prohibitive rule, the extension of jurisdiction is unlimited. 
  
Regardless of the judgment’s relevance22, it is unanimously agreed that international 
law imposes certain limits on the expansion of state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction which 
the Lotus judgment confirmed by stating that:  
 
17  Belgium and Judge Van den Wyngaert in the arrest warrant case. relied heavily on the Lotus principle 
by asserting that absence any prohibitive rule Belgium was free to expand the reach of its jurisdiction. 
18  The Lotus Case, Judgment No.9,1927,P.C.I.J, Series A, .18.19., 
19 M. Morris, “High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States” 64 Law & Contemp 
Prob (2001).p.47. 
20  Ibid,20 
21  Ibid,20 
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“This discretion left to Stats by International Law explains the great variety of rules 
which they have been able to adopt without objections or complaints on the part of other 
States [..]In these circumstances, all that can be required of a state is that it should not 
overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these 
limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.”23  
 
Under customary law of criminal jurisdiction, the assertion of jurisdiction has to be 
grounded on a legitimate prosecutorial interest based on the criminal act or the alleged 
criminal linkage to the prosecuting state24 which will be the case when the prosecution 
falls under one of the recognized principles of jurisdiction.25 
 
It is very important to bear in mind that the rules of allocating jurisdictions are not 
crystal clear in international law and that they interweave in practice, in addition to that, 
many national courts do not articulate the grounds of their jurisdiction or they just cite 
various forms in an equivocal fashion26. For such reasons the task of presenting these 
principles in predetermined moulds is always inconclusive27. 
 
 
22  The case did not involve international crime and the French officer was arrested in Turkey. See also 
Reydams, ibid 1, he pithily stated that“[t]wo major conclusions could be drawn from the pronouncement. 
First, international law governs the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreigners. If states had 
absolute discretion, extraterritorial jurisdiction would simply not be an issue. Second, international law 
recognizes (multiple) concurrent jurisdictions. If states were forbidden from extending the application of 
their criminal law and jurisdiction of their courts to persons and acts outside their territory, then 
extraterritorial, and a fortori universal jurisdiction would be illegal and that would be the end of the 
discussion. So the extreme views [..] seem to have been completely abandoned.”.p.16. 
23  “Lotus”,ibid 18, at .12-13. 
24 Brownlie, ibid 13, stated that “The principles are in substance generalization of mass of national 
provisions.” And that “It may be that each individual principle is only evidence of reasonableness of 
exercise of jurisdiction.” P306. 
25  Ibid, noting that there should be a substantial and bona fide connection between the subject matter and 
the source of jurisdiction.”p.313. See also Fritz A. Mann, observing that “[i]n essence criminal 
jurisdiction is determined not by such external, mechanical and inflexible tests as territory or nationality, 
but by the closeness of a state’s connection with, or the intimacy and legitimacy of its interest in, the facts 
in issue:”, Studies in the International Law. No.3(1974)p.80, cited in M. Morris, ibid,19.p.49. 
26  United State v. Younis, District Court, February 12,1988, the court referred to the universality 
principle, where the case was a pure application of the passive nationality principle, quoted in Luis 
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Generally, international law recognizes six bases for the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: 
 
1. Derivatives of Territorial jurisdiction: A state has the right to subject to its 
 criminal law crimes committed on its territory, the interest and competence is self-
evident when the crime takes place within the state’s boundaries, but may a state rely on 
this ground of jurisdiction to prosecute an alien present on its territory for crimes 
committed abroad?  
Many answer in the affirmative based on the forum state’s uncontested right to defend 
its public order as an expression of its internal sovereignty, because the mere presence 
of an unpunished criminal threatens the domestic moral and legal order.28  
 
A further view propounded that the mere categorization of a specific act as an 
international crime turns the prohibition into a peremptory norm permitting the 
custodial state to establish its jurisdiction over a present alien.29 
This form of jurisdiction has been utilized as the jurisdictional ground to enforce many 
international conventions, starting with genocide30, apartheid31 followed by various 
Terrorist conventions32. 
 
Benavides, The Universal Jurisdiction Principle: Nature and Scope, Annuario Mexicano de Derenchos 
International, Vol.p.24.   
27  Brownlie, ibid 12, declared that “[t]here is some risk in presenting the law in a schematic form, yet the 
usual presentation of different facets of jurisdiction is separate competences can obscure certain essential 
and logical points.” P.309. 
28  The opinion of Bursa in the report of Von Bar and Bursa presented in the context of the Institute of 
International Law, Munich Session of 1883, quoted in L. Reydams, ibid 1.p.31. 
29 M. Shaw, ibid.15, stated that “[i]nternational law recognises that domestic legal orders may validly 
establish and exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offender. Such circumstances thus include the 
presence of the accused and in this way may be differentiating from universal jurisdiction as such.” P.598. 
30  Article VI of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  9 Sep, 
1948. U.N.T.S,Vol.78,p.277. 
31  Article 5 of the U.N. International Convention on the Suppression and punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, 30 Nov, 1973. I.L.M, 13(1974),P.50. 
 11
                                                                                                                                              
Another derivative of the territorial principle is the effect principle, which confers on 
the state the authority to judge non-territorial acts that have a substantial territorial 
effect on the state’s interests. In the United States the latter is recognized as an 
independent basis of jurisdiction frequently employed to try violations of security 
exchange regulations.33  
 
(ii) The Nationality principle and other personal links: A state has jurisdiction over 
 crimes committed by its nationals abroad. Some states restrict the reach of their 
jurisdiction under this basis by requiring that the act is criminalized under the law of the 
place of commission, or is punishable with certain degree of severity, such restrictions 
are self imposed and are not required by international law. In exercising this form of 
jurisdiction the nationality state is regulating crimes which properly occurred within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the territorial state. To resolve such concurrence of jurisdictions 
scholars have referred to the concept of proper law or genuine link, which could be 
established by searching for the “state or states whose contact with the facts is such as 
to make the allocation of legislative competence just and reasonable.” 34 
 
Some states expand the nationality basis by recognizing other personal links between 
the state and the individuals present on its territory because by willingly choose to have 
the legal residence in a foreign state, a person establishes a legal links with the state of 
residence and accepts its laws. 
 
32  For instance article 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 14 Dec 1973, ibid. p.41. 
33  Wade Estey, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the Presumption 
against Extraterritoriality, 21 Hastings Int’l  & Comp. L. (1997).p.182. 
34  Fritz A Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Recueil des cours III (1964). P.44-48 
cited in  D.W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns Of Authority Over Activities And Resources, 
Brit.Y.B.Int’l(1982) p.8.  
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Denmark,35 Iceland, Liberia, and Sweden claim jurisdiction over crimes committed 
abroad by their permanent residents. In few cases the United Kingdom36 has also based 
jurisdiction on residence37. 
Under such laws it could be argued that the jurisdiction is territorial, “[b]ut in reality it 
is not, for the obligations imposed often bear on the person whilst abroad. In reality the 
resident is assimilated to the national [..], for the purpose of the particular legislation in 
question , the resident’s links with the state are as close as those of a national38.  
 
(iii) Passive nationality: A state may assert jurisdiction where the victim of the 
act is a national of the state asserting jurisdiction39 
(iv)Protective principle: A nation may exercise jurisdiction over individuals who 
 have committed an act abroad which is deemed prejudicial to its security and economy. 
The classic crimes for this type of jurisdiction are those of violating immigration 
regulations, drug trafficking and counterfeiting of national currency.40 National legal 
systems do not contain a uniform regulation of what could be considered a vital 
interest.41 
 
 
35  The Danish Penal Code Strfl §7(1) (2) contains a general active personality clause extends to resident 
aliens, and to citizens and resident aliens of Finland, Iceland, Norway, or Sweden, provided their presence 
in Denmark. Reydams, ibid.1. p.126. 
36  In the U.K the nationality principle is practiced to prosecute present aliens for war crimes committed 
during the Second World War as well as crimes envisaged in the Statute of the ICC, in Brazil with regard 
to genocide. Antonio Cassesse, International Criminal Law.p.282. 
37 Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, Brit.Y.B.Int’l.(1972/73).p.156. See also Jurgen  
Meyer, The Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction, Harvard Int’l L J. 
Vol 31, No 1, he used the term principle of domicile to describe this form of jurisdiction.p.112. 
38 Bowett, ibid 34.p.8-9. 
39 Reydams, ibid 1. In France the cour d’assises of Paris tried and convicted in absentia Captain Alfredo 
Astiz, a member of the Argentine military junta, for the kidnapping and disappearance in Argentina of 
two French nuns. p. 132. 
40  L  Benavides, ibid 26.p.26. 
41 Remarkably, Article 161(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code renders liable to punishment “whoever, in 
time of peace, spreads or relates unfounded or intentional rumours or news so as to cause the excitement 
and unrest of the public, or engage in activities harmful to national interests..” .D.W.Bowett, ibid 34,p.11. 
Another example article 13 of the Israeli Penal Law which provides for protective jurisdiction extending 
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(v)The presentation principle: A state may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
 where it deemed to be acting for another state which is more directly involved, 
provided that certain conditions are met. In general, these conditions are a request from 
another state to take over criminal proceedings, or either the refusal of an extradition 
request from another state and its willingness to prosecute or confirmation from another 
state that it will not request extradition.42  
The Germanic legal systems43use the term vicarious administration of justice based on 
the maxim aut dedere aut judicare which has been codified in the national penal codes 
long before its appearance in the international criminal law conventions.44Under the 
German and Austrian laws the maxim is applicable towards all states without the need 
for a specific extradition treaty with the state of the commission or the nationality state. 
Their courts have the competence to prosecute any present alien for acts committed 
abroad where the more competent state virtually consent to that jurisdiction or in such 
circumstances where extradition is impossible because the criminal jurisdiction of the 
territorial state is temporarily ineffective . The principle has been actively employed in 
the prosecution of serious crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s.  
This system is presented as the most important supplement to territorial 
jurisdiction45.Different theories have been articulated to justify its exercise as a form of 
complementary jurisdiction46. As a pragmatic explanation it has been suggested that: 
 “An offence should never remain unpunished; the possibility to cross borders should 
not shield the common criminal from punishment. He has to be aware that wherever he 
goes he will be held responsible. It is thus the duty of the custodial state to supply an 
inadequacy of the territorial state and the state of nationality of the offender, which by 
 
to offences committed abroad against any Israeli national, resident, or a Jaw as such. .Reydams, ibid 
1.p.158. 
42  Council of Europe. European Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction 
(1990). 14, quoted in Reydams, ibid. 1 p. 22. 
43  This form of jurisdiction is provided for in Germany “ stellvertretende Strafrechtpfleg” in the StGB§ 
7(2)(2) quoted in L. Reydams. Ibid 1. p. 143, and in Austria the StGB§65(1) (1).ibid. p. 95. 
44  Austrian Penal Codes of 1803 and 1852 established this ground of jurisdiction, ibid1.p.30. 
45  J. Meyer, ibid, 37. p.115. 
46  Reydams, ibid 1, cites opinions of several prominent scholars justifying the jurisdiction of the 
custodial state either on natural law considerations or on positivism. P.28-34. 
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hypothesis cannot act. To defeat the eventual calculations of the offender, that is the 
master idea of the subsidiary jurisdiction.”47  
Vicarious jurisdiction differs from the universality principle, in that it is rather a result 
of denying a safe haven to a fugitive, than a positive right to exercise universal 
jurisdiction.48  
 
However, in theory, the representational aspect in this regard may become doubtful 
when the state that possesses the strongest link objects to the competence of the 
custodial state. In reality states are bent on prosecuting crimes on their territories or by 
or against their nationals. Therefore, a concerned state would probably react by either 
delegating its competence through consent or alternatively demanding the offender’s 
extradition. 
 
(vi)Universal jurisdiction: “A state has jurisdiction to unilaterally prescribe,  
adjudicate, and enforce laws. This amounts to firstly establishing its laws with regard to 
persons, secondly applying these laws to these persons in criminal proceedings, and 
finally inducing or compelling compliance or punishing non-compliance, with these 
laws. Thus, when a state exercises its unilateral jurisdiction by virtue of the principle of 
universality, it establishes its jurisdiction over a crime without it having a link to the 
crime. The state in question is acting without delegation of jurisdiction over the matter 
by state that is linked to the crime and in the absence of any delegation (fictive or real) 
on behalf of the international community at large”.49 
 
 
In the light of the above, the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be based on 
various grounds but such expansion of jurisdiction is not always universal, and 
sometimes it is difficult to distinguish in practice the various principles in an absolute 
 
47  K. Mikliszanski, Le system de l’universalite du droit de punir et le droit penal subsidiaire, (1936) p. 
331-333, quoted in Reydams ibid 1. p.33. 
48  Donnedieu de Vabers, qouted in Reydams, ibid1. p. 37. 
49 Nicholas Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court. 29 The Manitoba 
Law Journal, (2002).p.2. 
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manner50. Nevertheless, a test could be adopted to differentiate the other principal 
grounds from the universal principle. The defining line is that the latter is exercised 
without an evidently criteria, requirement or link to the state’s territory or inhabitants, 
thus, if such underlying considerations exist in a concrete case the jurisdiction could not 
be conceived as universal, because the universality principle implies that all states are 
affected by the act in question, and have the same interest in prosecuting its 
perpetrator51. 
   
Before embarking upon a detailed exposition of the principle in question, it is important 
to note that the term universal has been used indiscriminately to describe different 
concepts in the realm of international criminal law. Therefore, one has to be mindful 
that the universal condemnation of a given crime dose not justify its prosecution by 
every state. Such condemnation results in rendering the crime prohibited as customary 
international law norm binding every state even those non-parties to the proscribing 
convention, if there is one, with no affect on states jurisdictional competence52. 
 
 
50 Brownlie, ibid 13, stated that “[t]he objective application of the territorial principle and also the passive 
personality principle have strong similarities to the protective or security principle. Nationality and 
security may go together, or, in the case of the alien, factors such as residence may support a rather ad hoc 
notion of allegiance.”.p.306. See also M.C. Bassiouni,. Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: 
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, he stated that [T]here is sometimes no clear 
distinction between the principle of universality and other principles on which extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is based, such as the presentation principle or the principle of protection. There are often different of 
opinions as to which principle should form the basis of a particular term of extraterritorial jurisdiction.’ 
24 Va.J.Int’l L. (2001).P.103. 
51  Bassiouni,, ibid , stated that “[T]he reach of a state may be universal to the extraterritorial jurisdiction 
theories ‘protected interests’ and ‘passive nationality’ but in all of them there is a connection or a legal 
nexus between the sovereignty and territoriality of the enforcing state[..] Thus, the universal reach of 
extraterritorial national jurisdiction does not equate with universal jurisdiction.” .p. 94 See also S.Z.Feller, 
Jurisdiction Over Offences With a Foreign Element,  observing that the serious nature of some crime 
“[t]hreatens to determine the very foundations of the enlightened international community as a whole, and 
it is this quality that gives each one of the members of the community the right to extend the incidence of 
its criminal law to them..” cited in Lee A Steven, Genocide And The Duty To Extradite or Prosecute: Why 
The United States Is In Breach Of Its International Obligations. 39. Va .J. Int’l L. P.436.  
52  R.Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It, stated that the mere fact that 
an action is a violation of international law does not of itself give rise to universal jurisdiction. p.96. and 
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2.3 Universal jurisdiction 
 
Negatively defined universal jurisdiction “means that there is no link of territoriality or 
nationality between the [prosecuting] state and the conduct or the offender, nor is the 
state seeking to protect its security or credit”53 
 
A clear example of universal jurisdiction is provided for in the new German “Code of 
Crimes against International law’, it states that “This Act shall apply to all criminal 
offences against international law designated under this Act, to serious criminal 
offences designated therein even when the offence was committed abroad and bears no 
relation to Germany(emphasis added)”54   
 
In practice, the proceedings initiated in Belgium and the issuance of the arrest warrant 
against the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo epitomize the essence of universal 
jurisdiction, because neither Mr Yerodia nor the victims were Belgians, and the alleged 
crimes were committed outside Belgian territory, and he was not in Belgium when the 
proceeding initiated.  
 
in response to the claim made in the Restatement(Third) that International crime is presumably subject to 
universal jurisdiction, she added that attributing the notion of crime to a certain act would serve two 
purposes. The first is to attach a generalized sense of opprobrium to the offence in question. The second is 
to suggest that universal jurisdiction would be tolerated. p.62. See also Christian Tomuschat “Issues of 
Universal Jurisdiction in the Schilingo Case”, criticizing the reasoning of the Spanish court, he argues 
that “There can be no doubt that, to date, crimes against humanity recognized as crimes under 
international criminal law for the commission of which the perpetrator incur individual criminal 
responsibility. But the question of licence to prosecute is a different one. Even before attempting to show 
in a detailed analysis that universal jurisdiction exists for crimes against humanity. The Audiencia 
Nacional pre-emptively claims that this is the case. It is of the view that individual criminal responsibility 
and universal jurisdiction go hand in hand…” 3. J .I. C. J. (2005).P.1078.   
53 Reydams, ibid 1.p.5. 
54 Code of Crimes against International Law (VStGB§1) entered into force on 27 June 2002.L Reydams, 
ibid 1. p. 144. 
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The uncertainty surrounding the principle, in a considerable part, originates in the 
definitional approach taken by many commentators55.The term universal jurisdiction 
has been inaccurately employed to prescribe various forms of jurisdiction which are 
substantially different from the universal jurisdiction, for this reason it becomes 
essential from the outset to underline its intrinsic features and what it accurately 
denotes. 
 
2.3.1 Universal jurisdiction in absentia 
The term in absentia has been used, among other variations, to describe the universality 
principle that may mislead us to believe that there exist two distinct basis of universal 
jurisdiction, that is to say, universal jurisdiction in absentia and universal jurisdiction in 
personma, and consequently the validity of each has to be assessed independently of the 
other. 
 
Requiring the presence of the alleged offender on the territory of the state as 
prerequisite to allow its exercise of universal jurisdiction56, constitutes the most 
common confusion of the term. The point here is that when the prosecuting state has 
apprehended the offender it becomes obliged under the relevant convention to extradite 
or prosecute him, if extradition proves infeasible, for factual or legal reasons, then it is 
empowered to exercise a conventional obligatory territorial jurisdiction. That is not the 
universal jurisdiction which distinctly envisages nothing else but the prosecution absent 
any nexus even the presence of the alleged criminal.  
  
 
55 . Mark A. Summers, International Court of Justice’s Decision in the Congo v. Belgium: How has if 
affected the Development of a principle of universal jurisdiction that would obligate All States to 
Prosecute War Criminals? He noted that “[t]he definitional problem is further complicated because in 
many cases the facts lend themselves to different interpretations, thus, what a court or commentator 
means when referring to universal jurisdiction is often unclear.” .B. U. Int’l L .J. Vol 21 (2003).p.70. 
56  Harvard Research took the view that universal jurisdiction “may be invoked only if the alien is present 
in a place subject to the authority of the state assuming jurisdiction,” and “the presence of the accused 
provides the basis for jurisdiction” Harvard Research p .582, cited in M. Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction 
in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes Under 
International Law, (INTERSENTIA, Antwerpen-Oxford) .p.54. 
 18
                                                
Separate Joint Opinion unequivocally acknowledged that prosecuting a present alien 
should not be confused with universal jurisdiction since the former is a treaty-based 
obligation to exercise jurisdiction over persons who commit acts elsewhere and are 
present within the state territory.  It pointed out that it is more accurate to describe this 
as: 
“Jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over a persons for extraterritorial 
events” than as “universal jurisdiction”. The distinction limits the definition of universal 
jurisdiction to its purest form- exercising jurisdiction over international crimes without 
any other basis for jurisdiction in international law.” 57 
 
The above justifies the conclusion that the maxim of aut dedere aut judiciare does not 
imply universal jurisdiction because its application is limited to the parties to a given 
convention which as a general rule of international law can create neither rights nor 
obligations for non-party states58. In contrast, universal jurisdiction is attributable 
virtually to any state since it is not premised on any specific contractual provision.59 
 
Since all the core international crimes, except for crimes against humanity, are 
universally condemned by multilateral agreements providing for variable forms of the 
extradite or prosecute scheme, then by ratifying or acceding to one of these conventions, 
a state willingly recognizes the competence of the other states parties to prosecute its 
nationals whenever it does not request extradition.60 
 
 
57  Separate Joint Opinion, ibid 10, para 44-57. To elucidate the difference between the principle and the 
conduct of trials in absentia, it noted that “[s]ome jurisdictions provide for trial in absentia, others do not. 
If it is said that a person must be within the jurisdiction at the time of trial itself, that may be a prudent 
guarantee for the right of fair trial but has little to do with bases of jurisdiction recognized under 
international law”. Para 56. 
58  Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.331. 
59  Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an effective System of Universal jurisdiction for 
Crimes under international Law, considers that “The obligation of aut dedere aut judicare. Once a state 
ratifies or accedes to a treaty, it has no option on the matter. Hence, this form of jurisdiction is not truly’ 
universal”, but is a regime of judicial rights and obligations arising among a closed set of state parties” 
New Eng. L. Rev.(2001).p.401. 
60  Lord Slynn of Hadley in his speech before House of Lords in Pinochet 1, opined that  “ Chile was a 
state party to the Convention and it therefore accepted that, in respect of offences of torture, the United 
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There could be one hypothetical situation where the aforementioned application would 
appear unsound, namely in respect of crimes against humanity, in this case the 
prosecution of a present alien is obviously not a contractual obligation due to the non-
existence of a treaty. Nevertheless, it could not be deemed universal for the reasons I 
will discuss in [2.3.2]. 
 
The extradite or prosecute clause is not provided for in the Genocide Convention or the 
1949 Geneva Conventions61 with regard to war crimes other than the grave breaches. 
Thus, a decision to prosecute a present alien suspected for having committed these 
crimes abroad could be regarded as an exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction if based on 
these conventions. But the prosecution in such circumstances could be based on other 
grounds of jurisdiction as it will be demonstrated in [ 2.3.2] 
 
It becomes apparent and safe to exclude extradite or try clause when discussing 
universal jurisdiction.62 
 
Kingdom should either extradite[to Spain] or take proceedings against offending officials found in its 
jurisdiction” Pinochet 1,1A.C.61,83( H.L1998). 
 
61  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, Aug.12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.NT.S.31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 74 
U.N.T.S.85; Geneva Convention Relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,1949,6 
U.T.S.3316,74 U.N.T.S.135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of 
War, Aug 12,1949,6 U.S.T.3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ( hereinafter Geneva Conventions); Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug.12,1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),UN.GAOR,32 ed Sess, Annex 1, at 10, U.N.Doc A/32/144 
(1977).  
62 Benavides, ibid 26,amply demonstrates the difference between universal jurisdiction and the maxim 
extradite or prosecute.p.32-36. 
 20
                                                
 
     
  
2.3.2 May universal jurisdiction be delegated? 
 
Many prominent scholars63 claim that the obligation to extradite or prosecute has 
evolved into international customary law with regard to serious international crimes. 
Hence, all states have an affirmative obligation to prosecute alleged criminals present 
on their territory, provided that no other state requests the offender’s extradition. The 
proposition implies that the exercise of jurisdiction in such event is mandatory and 
accordingly the invalidity of the term obligatory territorial jurisdiction. 
 
This construction has been promoted and furthered, amongst others, by the Institute of 
International Law which suggests that: 
“Unless other wise lawfully agreed, the exercise of universal jurisdiction shall be 
subject to the following provisions:[..]C) Any state having custody over an alleged 
offender should, before commencing a trial on basis of universal jurisdiction, ask the 
state where the crime was committed or the state of nationality of the person concerned 
whether it is prepared to prosecute that person, unless these states are manifestly 
unwilling or unable to do so.” 64 
 
It is difficult to subscribe to this assumption for three main reasons: 
 
 
63  Lee Steven, ibid 51, opined that “[c]urrent customary international law suggests that states now have 
an affirmative obligation to either exercise universal jurisdiction and prosecute perpetrators of serious 
international crimes such as genocide or extradite them to a country or international tribunal that will 
prosecute them.” p.430. The ICTY Appeals Chamber  in Blaskic Case stated that “ The national 
jurisdiction of the states of Ex-Yugoslavia, as those of other states, are required by customary law to 
judge or to extradite those persons presumed responsible for grave breaches of international humanitarian 
law “ The Decision of the ICTY of 29 October 1997,Case IT-95-14-AR,para 29. 
64  The Institute of International Law, Seventeenth Session, Universal Jurisdiction with Regard to Crimes 
of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes. August 26, 2005.avilable at  
 http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf  (last visited 12.06.2006). 
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First, there exists no consistent state practice expressing opinion juris to support the 
claim. Moreover, even when the clause is agreed upon as a conventional obligation, 
many states fail to implement the clause in timely fashion, or if they enact the necessary 
incorporating legislation they restrict its application65.  
Second, even if the extradite or prosecute scheme becomes a customary rule, it does not 
directly imply universal jurisdiction, because it does not in itself dictate which bases of 
national jurisdiction a state can exercise66. 
Third, even if one agrees arguendo to this claim, the jurisdiction of the loci 
deprehensios derives from that of the other state which has the direct link to the crime 
and possesses the original competence to judge it. That is to say, the latter delegates its 
primary territorial, protective or nationality jurisdiction to the forum state by means of 
express assent or by not demanding the offender’s extradition. 
Thus, the forum state is acting as a representative of the aforesaid state in exercising a 
classical jurisdictional basis which by no means could be denominated universal. The 
same argument holds true for the incorrectly labelled delegated universal jurisdiction, 
for what is delegated in such case is a territorial, nationality or protective jurisdiction, 
but not a universal jurisdiction. 
 
Theoretically, there could be one application where such jurisdiction could not be 
characterized as representative. That is where the custodial state offers to the other state 
the opportunity to prosecute, but the latter declines to take over the case, and in addition 
to that it denies the forum state’s right to entertain the proceedings.  
 
Such hypothesis is unlikely to materialize in today’s world where states, as long as they 
have functioning criminal justice system, are overly protective and they would not allow 
others to judge acts they deem solicitude worthy.  Nevertheless, should such case occur, 
the forum state could validly premise and justify its jurisdiction by virtue of objective 
territoriality and protective principles because the alternative to not prosecuting the 
 
65  Only in 1993 Belgium adopted the Act to implement the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols, and it did not implement the Genocide Convention until 1999, while article V thereof obliges 
states to enact the necessary legislation. For more instances see  A. Cassese, ibid 36.p.305-6. 
66  Inazumi, ibid 56.p.141. 
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alleged international criminal would be to award him a de facto asylum67, which is an 
indefensible outcome in any functioning legal order68. Moreover, harbouring such 
criminals may entail stigmatization and unbearable political pressure on the concerned 
state.69  
  
In sum, even if one considers that the duty to extradite or prosecute has turned into an 
international customary norm, it is still a vicarious jurisdiction which is different from 
the universality principle. 
One commentator persuasively articulated this difference, he observed that: 
“The norms based upon the principle of vicarious administration of justice are to be 
differentiated from those arising from the principle of universality, since the ability to 
prosecute under vicarious administration is dependent on the liability to punishment at 
the site of the offence and on the question of extradition, which is not the case under 
universal jurisdiction. This stems from the fact that that each principle pursued a 
different objective. The principle of vicarious administration of justice allows another 
 
67 The U.N General Assembly adopted in 1973 a resolution rejecting the grant of asylum to persons 
accused or convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Principles of International Co-
operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.Res 3074 (XXVIII), U.N.GAOR,28th Sess., Supp.No.30, at 78, U.N.Doc, 
A/9030 (1973). 
68  The Bavarian Supreme Court in the case of Djajic, accused of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
addressing the jurisdictional question declared that “Considerations of international law are important, but 
one should not overlook the fact that the prosecution of a foreigner for crimes committed abroad also 
serves an interest of the state of residence, namely not to become a refuge for offenders who have 
committed crimes under customary and conventional international law. Not to prosecute would 
undermine the trust of the German citizens in the national and international legal order” .L. Reydams, ibid 
1.p.151.  The same concerns were expressed  in the Netherlands in the discussions regarding the 
implementation of article 5 of the Torture Conventions, observations in the parliamentary records(quoted 
in the initial report of the Netherlands to the Committee Against Torture,  it was considered that “A 
veritable shock wave would go through the Dutch legal order if, faced with the presence in this country of 
a foreign national recognized as a torturer by witnesses and victims, the court were to declare themselves 
incompetent to hear the case.”.Reydams,ibid1.p.169. 
69  Libya was forced by the international community to surrender two of its nationals suspected of the 
Lockerbie accident. Under similar pressure and threats of withholding financial assistance Yugoslavia 
surrendered Milosevic to the ICTY and recently Nigeria, with the consent of his national state, handed 
over the former president of Liberia Mr Charles Taylor to the Special Court of Sierra lone. 
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state to enforce a criminal law norm which the original state itself could have enforced, 
whereas a state enforces a criminal law norm under the principle of universality because 
the world community has determined the offence to be generally punishable.” 70 
 
The German Penal Code in Section 7(2) (2)71 lays down the principle of representative 
administration of justice which confers jurisdiction on the German authorities in case 
where requests of extradition are not made or rejected, or because extradition is not 
feasible. The law recognizes this form as a discrete ground of jurisdiction different from 
the universal one.72 
 
The delegation of jurisdiction is not unknown notion in international criminal law, albeit 
in contractual fashion. For instance, it constitutes the jurisdictional competence of the 
ICC as it is delegated to it by states- parties and of member states of the European 
Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters.73 
 
Finally, after illuminating the other forms of jurisdiction frequently confused with the 
principle in question, what remains is the essence of what could rightly be called 
 
70  Rudiger Wolfrum, The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences Through National Courts, 
in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory eds, War Crimes in International Law(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1996) p 236. 
71 . Reydams,ibid 1 p 143. 
72  The vicarious jurisdiction was recently practiced in Germany with regard to a complaint filed by the 
American Centre for Constitutional Rights, on November 30.2004, against the American Minister of 
Defence Rumsfeld, the former CIA Director Tenet and U.S military personnel for allegedly committing 
acts of torture in the Iraqi prison Abu Gharib. The complaint was dismissed by the federal prosecutor on 
February 10,2005, The German prosecutor referred to the principle of complementarity and concluded 
that there were no indications that the U.S had refrained or would refrain from investigating the alleged 
offences, available at : 
 http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/septemper_ 11th/doc/German_prosecutor_Decision2_10_05.pdf. 
(last visited Feb 12.2006) 
73  Article 2(1) provides that “[f]or the purpose of applying this Convention, any Contracting State shall 
have competence to prosecute under its own criminal law any applicable.” The European Convention on 
Transfer of proceedings in Criminal Matters. March.30,1978. Europ.T.S.No.73. For more examples of 
delegation of jurisdiction see Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over 
Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits. 1,  J. I. C. J.(2003). p 627-634. 
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universal jurisdiction. In this writing the term universal jurisdiction will be used to 
describe “the right of a state to institute legal proceedings and to try the presumed 
author of an offence, irrespective of the place where the said offence has been 
committed, the nationality or the place of residence of its presumed author or of the 
victim.74”  
 
 
  
2.4 Universal jurisdiction and jus cogens, obligatio erga omnes 
 
Many scholars75vigorously postulate that the categorization by the international 
community of specific acts as serious international crimes has attained the status of 
peremptory norm. Accordingly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction to prosecute their 
perpetrators has ipso facto elevated to erga omnes obligation toward the whole 
international community. The acceptance of this position would tantamount to declaring 
the exercise of the principle as a customary international rule incumbent upon every 
state.76 
 
74  Brussels Principles against Impunity and For International Justice, Principle 13 available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/BrusselsPrinciples6Nov02.pdf?PHPSESSID=bd9a11feb4e61458e
f2b6cc5663d905c  (last visited 12.06.2006) 
75 Bassiouni, ibid 50, declared that “the writings of the most distinguished publicist also support the 
proposition that jus cogens crimes [which include war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity] require 
the application of universal jurisdiction when other means of carrying out the obligation deriving from aut 
dedere aut judicare have proven ineffective.” See also Randall, ibid 12, views that “Once an offence rise 
to an international crime it is ipso facto subject to universal jurisdiction”.p.381. 
76 The ICTY in the Furundzija case declared that“ one of the consequences of the jus cogens character 
bestowed by international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every state is entitled to 
investigate, prosecute and punish[…] individuals accused of torture[…] indeed it would be inconsistent 
on the one hand to prohibit torture to such extent as to restrict the normally unfettered powers of 
sovereign states, and on the other hand bar states from prosecuting and punishing those torturers who 
have engaged in this odious practice abroad.’’  
 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.IT-95-17/1-T,The ICTY Trial Chamber II, Judgment of 10 December 
1998, para 156. See also Andrea Bianchi, Immunity v. Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, he argues that 
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The advocates of this claim rely on the dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Tractions 
case. The court held that:  
“[a]n essential difference should be drawn between the obligations of a state towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another state in the field 
of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all states. In 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for 
example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.” 77 
 
The construction of imperative law is evidently extraneous to the positivist doctrine 
which denies any obligation that is not deliberately agreed upon or accepted by states. 
There is no international instrument defining and recognizing the existence of these 
rules, and it could not be argued that such undefined norms78could or have become 
customary international law in respect to jurisdictional grounds for the lack of 
practice.79 
 
 
the Tadic judgment justifies states in taking jurisdiction on the basis of universality principle, 10,EJIL 
(1999) p. 245.  
77  Barcelona Tractions, Light and Power Co Ltd.(Belgium v. Spain),1970 I.C.J. report, p. 32 
78 .  A.Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Coigens and Offences Erga Omnes? noticed that it is not clear whether 
the restrictions on jurisdiction to adjudicate are part of jus cogens. 35 New Eng.L.Rev.(2001).p.269. 
79  In 1988 in the Committee of United states Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan the D.C Circuit 
Court of Appeal declared that to qualify as jus cogens, a norm should “to become a rule must first become 
a rule of customary law, which occurs when the extensive and uniform practice of individual nations 
reveals their willingness for the rule to become a law. A customary norm evolves into peremptory norm 
when the international community as a whole recognizes that the norm is one that permits no 
derogation.”, quoted in Jodi Horowitz. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of the Police for the 
Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity for Jus 
Cogens Violations. 23 Fordham Int’l.L.J. (1999.2000).p.508. 
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The proposition attributes an aura of sanctity to the argument,80 but does not reconcile 
with the international law, which as it currently stands rejects this assumption in respect 
of jurisdiction. That is evidenced by the International Law Commission Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) which in article 
41(2) contemplates the consequences of serious breach of a jus cogens norm, it limits 
the consequences to“[n]o state shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious 
breach[…] nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation”, and it does not 
mention any erga omnes obligation to prosecute or a duty to exercise universal 
jurisdiction. 
  
Furthermore, the putative overriding status of the peremptory rules81 is unsupported by 
any case law. 
In the South West Africa judgement the ICJ held that: 
“[h]umanitarian consideration may constitute the inspiration basis for rules of law […]. 
Such considerations do not, however, in themselves amount to rules of law. All states 
are interested-have interest- in such matters. But the existence of an ‘interest’ does not 
itself entail that this interest is specifically judicial in character.”82  
 
This pronouncement has been borne out by the court’s decision in the Arrest Warrant 
case by not recognizing the prohibition of serious international crimes as of superior 
and overriding status over any other principles83.The court weighted the underlying 
 
 
80  The ICTY declared that “[i]t would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, 
should the concept of state sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human rights.” 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), Judgment of 2 October 1995, 105 ILR 
453, at 483.  
81  Andrea Bianchi, ibid 76, stated that ” If one characterizes the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens 
norm, the inevitable conclusion is that no other treaty or customary law rule, including the rules of 
jurisdictional immunities, can derogate from it.” P.245. 
82  South West Africa (1966) 50, printed in Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, ICJ 
(1966). 
83  Judge Al-Khasawneh addressed the question of the jus cogens hierarchy, he declared that “[e]ffective 
combating of grave crimes has arguably assumed a jus cogens character reflecting recognition by the 
international community of the vital community interests and values it seek to protect and enhance. 
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value of these rules from which, supposedly, no derogation is permissible, against those 
of immunity which are amenable to waiver and renouncement. The court sided with the 
latter by upholding the immunity of the Congolese Minister from prosecution for the 
callous and atrocious crimes he allegedly committed. In this regard the judgment could 
be interpreted as denying the contended supreme rank of the prohibition of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. 
The national jurisprudence of the majority of states provides a plethora of evidence to 
refute the alleged jus cogens rational84. Many courts have ruled in favour of immunities 
and statutory limitations in well known cases involving the perpetration of the most 
appalling crimes knowing to mankind. 85 
The sphere of the jus cogens rules’ application is accepted to limit states’ power to enter 
international agreement which is otherwise unlimited86. Therefore, in itself does not 
order states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction87. 
In any case, the Barcelona Tractions decision is applicable only to the parties in that 
particular dispute88 and as a general rule judicial precedents are only subsidiary source 
of international law.89 
 
Therefore, when this hierarchically higher norms comes into conflict with the rules of immunity, it should 
prevail.” The Arrest Warrant Case, Judge Al-Khasawneh dissenting opinion,para.7. 
84 A prominent example is the case of Ariel Sharon who has never been tried in Israel, party to the 
Genocide Convention, for his complicity in genocide after that his responsibility was proved by an 
official Israeli commission of inquiry for the crimes committed against Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 
1982. The crimes were condemned by the UNGA as “an act of genocide”. Furthermore, when 
proceedings were initiated against him in Belgium, both Sharon and the state of Israel intervened in the 
case which was finally dismissed because he was not present in Belgium and for his immunity as a prime 
minister. L.Reydams, ibid.p.117  
85  Jodi Horowitz, ibid 79, quotes the Siderman Case where the 9th Circuit found that torture is jus cogens 
violation, but still granted impunity for acts of torture. 
86 . Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ibid, 58. 
87 Christopher C. Joyner’ Arresting Impunity: The Case of Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War 
Criminals to Accountability, observed that “ International law has traditionally distinguished the Erga 
Omnes and Jus Cogens doctrines from Universal jurisdiction, as both the former principles pertain to state 
responsibility, while the latter concerns violations of individual responsibility”.59. Law & Contemp. 
Prob.(1996).p. 169. 
88  Article 59 of the I.C.J Statute. 
89  Alfred Rubin, Is International Criminal Law Universal?  U Chicago Legal Forum (2001)p 169. 
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However, even if all states have a legal interest in a state’s discharge of its obligation to 
punish certain crimes that does not necessarily mean that other states also have 
jurisdiction over that crime.90 
 
2.5 Universal jurisdiction and state sovereignty 
 
Universal jurisdiction differentiates from other bases of jurisdiction by not being 
premised on the notion of sovereignty and its exercise can be construed as an 
encroachment on the sovereignty of the state where the offence occurred or of the home 
state of the perpetrator or the victim. 
 
Sovereignty mirrors realpolitik and it would be invoked to argue that universal 
jurisdiction in essence contradicts the basic notion of state sovereignty as it is enshrined 
in the canons of international law as expressed in article 2.1 UN charter. 
 
Each sovereign state bears the responsibility to judge international crimes perpetrated 
within its respective territory. In this respect sovereignty constitutes the linchpin of 
international criminal law. Sovereignty means that every state must have the 
opportunity to practice its jurisdiction domestically and not to be stripped of that right 
by other sovereigns claiming the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Should the national 
system within a given state break down rendering the state no longer physically able to 
wield sovereign authorities over its territory and population, then the assertion of 
jurisdiction over international crimes committed by whomever within the territory of the 
ravaged state or elsewhere by its nationals would be desirable. For instance, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Rwanda hailed the prosecution of their nationals in Germany and 
Belgium. 
 
 
90  Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction after the Creation of the International Court. 
36.N.Y.U.J.Int’l.L&Pol (2004).p.519. 
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Some argue that this conservative interpretation of sovereignty is no longer applicable 
and that the official position of a person does not shield him from personal criminal 
responsibility. That is underscored by the decision of the House of Lords to extradite 
Pinochet to Spain and Milosevic’s trial before the ICTY. They argue that these cases 
represent an evolution of international law and reflect a shift of priorities, namely that 
more weight is given to key humanitarian values and less to the traditional interpretation 
of state sovereignty.91 
 
The claim contradicts state practice which suggests that the reasons for their refrain 
from exercising the principle are related to reciprocal respect for each other’s 
prerogatives92. Indeed, even if the exercise of universal jurisdiction targets individuals, 
judging the act of an individual may imply, especially when the suspect is an agent of a 
foreign state, the responsibility of his state.93 
 
The American and Israeli fierce reactions to the Belgian exercise of universal 
jurisdiction evidence that the principle is still perceived as a violation of state 
sovereignty. The USA threatened to cut its financial contribution to a new NATO 
headquarter in Brussels94 in response to proceedings initiated against its former 
 
91  Kristin Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law. 8. M.S.U.D.C.L Int’l.L.J.(1999).P.612.  
92 Benavides, ibid26.p 41, qouting Graeffrath Bernhard, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an 
international Criminal Court, E.J.I.L, Vol 1, No.1-2,1990 stated that “To date, the industrially strong 
Western powers have decisively opposed universal criminal jurisdiction in the context of a code of 
offences against the peace and security of mankind[…]Fundamentally [they] based their position on the 
principle of sovereignty”. See also the opinion of lord Slynn in the Pinochet case; he stated that 
“Adjudicating, through universal jurisdiction, upon acts committed by public officials within their own 
territories breach a sound principle of judicial restrain and abstention, which governs the consideration of 
foreign sovereigns’ acts of states.” Pinochet 1 at 86. See also L. Reydams, ibid 1. referring to the 
preparatory work of the Genocide Convention which illustrates how states regarded any form of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction as threat to their sovereignty, p.47-53. 
93 Inazumi, ibid.56,p137. 
94. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation. 
Harvard Int’l. L.J. Vol 45, Nov 1(2004).p.189. 
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president Bush. With the same level of seriousness Israel reacted towards Sharon’s 
indictment for crimes against humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions.95 
In the Arrest Warrant Case the Congo considered the Belgian exercise of universal 
jurisdiction as a ‘coercive legal act’ violating its sovereignty, and it raised the same 
contention against France in the Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings.96   
Under this immense pressure Belgium, in 2003, was forced to repeal the law and its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction has become very limited.97   
 
Judge Van den Wyngaert 98 expressed the view that it is not for sovereignty reasons but 
for political convenience and practical considerations, such as the difficulty in obtaining 
evidence and the fear of overburdening their judiciary that states refrain from exercising 
universal jurisdiction. 
  
This interpretation is dubious because states have or could have adopted within their 
national systems certain mechanisms in order to avoid political inconvenience, for 
instance by enacting procedural requirements to prevent overloading the systems and 
saving scarce resources by filtering out what appears to be frivolous or vexatious 
petitions. 
The most accepted practice in this regard is to give the prosecutor a discretional power 
to evaluate and decide whether the filed petitions are worth investigating and 
prosecuting. 
To mention a few instances, the German Criminal Procedures Code 99(new section 153 
[f]) empowers the prosecutor to decide not to investigate situations when the alleged 
crime committed abroad by non-German and the alleged criminal is not present in 
Germany and there is no real chance of apprehending him. 
 
95  The Israeli Foreign Ministry legal adviser contemplated trade boycotts and other retaliatory measures 
against Belgium. Ibid.  
96  A Case Concerning Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v. France) (2003) available at  
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icofframe.htm (last visited 12.06.2006) 
97  Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a sensible Notion of Universal 
Jurisdiction. 1. J.I.C.J. (2003).p 589. 
98  Separate dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert. Para. 56. 
99  Reydams, ibid 1. p.145. 
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In the Netherlands, where trials in absentia are frequent, only the prosecutor and not 
civil petitioners is empowered to bring prosecutions, and only in cases where he deems 
that expedient.100  
  
The fact that sovereignty is increasingly losing ground is tangible in current 
international law, but when the issue of criminal jurisdiction is at stake, a state would 
not cede an important segment of its prerogatives to another state, that is because 
International criminal law is still driven by political as much as by legal considerations. 
 
The extradite or prosecute mechanism evidences how states insist on retaining at their 
discretion the opportunity to preclude other states from adjudicating any acts they 
consider falling within the ambit of their sovereignty. The clause is designed to give 
priority to the jurisdiction of the state with the strongest nexus, over that of the custodial 
state. Hence, the former is competent to demand for the purpose of prosecution the 
extradition of the offender. And by so doing, it retains what it considers sovereign acts 
within its exclusive jurisdiction.  
 
In conclusion, the exercise of universal jurisdiction, against the objection of the state 
where the offence took place or the offender’s national state, has been opposed and 
construed as usurpation of the latter’s authority to prosecute. 
  
2.6 The ICJ decision on the arrest warrant case  
 
The ICJ would have ruled on the issue of universal jurisdiction in the arrest warrant 
case, if the Congo had not abandoned in the final Memorial its contention to the legality 
of the universality principle as then exercised by Belgium. The court adhered strictly to 
the non ultra petita rule and decided not to address the issue of universal jurisdiction 
 
100  The Dutch prosecutor dismissed a complaint lodged against the Former Chilean President Pinochet 
for torture, for reasons relating to public interests, citing the potential legal and factual difficulties the 
Dutch legal system would encounter. The dismissal was further held by Amsterdam’s Court of Appeal in 
1995. Reydams, ibid 1.p. 169. 
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under which the arrest warrant was based.101 To judge the immunity issue, the court 
assumed that Belgium had jurisdiction under international law to issue and circulate the 
arrest warrant.102  
 
Nevertheless, by analyzing the judgment one may infer two important pronouncements 
regarding the question of jurisdiction. First, the judgment expressly negates the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction where the alleged offender is immune under international law. 
 
Second, the court held that: 
“ [t]he immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister 
for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecutions in certain 
circumstances: [..], after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international 
law in other state. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law”.103 
 
The passage implies that the court by requiring the prosecuting state to have jurisdiction 
under international law has not viewed the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction as 
mandatory when the alleged offender is not present in the prosecuting state’s territory. 
Indeed had the court found it compulsory, every state would have had the duty to 
prosecute non-present aliens, and the requirement for the jurisdiction to be valid under 
international law would be completely superfluous. 
 
Fortunately, some of the judges entered declarations and separate and joint opinions 
expressing diametrically different opinions. Their opinions demonstrate the multiplicity 
and divergence of the views among international law commentator regarding universal 
jurisdiction and the difference between scholars and state practice on the other hand. 
The opinions, though are obiter dicta, contribute significantly to the discussion over 
universal jurisdiction’s existence and legality. The judges expressed two different 
opinions: 
 
 
101  Judgment, para.41-43. 
102   Ibid, para. 46. 
103   Ibid, para.61. 
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First, President Guillaume studiously took a positivist view. After analyzing the practice 
of several states; he convincingly concluded that except for piracy the “[u]niversal 
jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to international law.104The same stance was taken 
by judges Ranjeva105 and Rezek106. 
 
Second, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buregenthal opined that the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is permissible, but that permissibility is subject to a set of 
conditions, among which: 
“A state contemplating to bring charges based on universal jurisdiction must first offer 
to the national state of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon 
the charges concerned”107 
The application of the judges’ suggestion could be controversial from the point of view 
of separation of powers doctrine because it ultimately implies the shifting of the whole 
matter from the judiciary to the executive branch which would be the foreign minister in 
this case. 
 
Moreover, due to lack of incentives, it is unpersuasive to require a state to first use its 
judiciary resources in investigating and indicting an alleged criminal, and subsequently 
offer his national state the opportunity to try him. It is unimaginable that such 
eventuality would occur simply because states do not prosecute in magnanimous and 
altruistic manner. 
The opinion of President Guillaume appears more convincing and reconcilable with the 
practice of states.  
All the judges extensively analyzed the international conventions and surveyed state 
practice and agreed that: 
“[n]on of the [national laws], nor the many others that have been studied by the court 
represent a classical assertion of universal jurisdiction over particular offences committed 
elsewhere by persons having no relation or connection with the forum state.”108 
 
104  Separate opinion of President Guillaume.para 9. 
105  In his separate opinion judge Ranjeva opined that universal jurisdiction in absentia is impermissible. 
para 8-12. 
106  Separate opinion of judge Rezek. para. 10 
107  Joint Separate Opinion, ibid 10, para 59. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
We have seen that scholars and courts lump together several forms of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction without delimiting the respective ambit of each of them, and how this 
attitude results in describing improperly some forms as universal in circumstances 
where the custodial state’s jurisdiction is obligatory territorial jurisdiction deriving from 
a treaty. Alternatively, absent a treaty, it is a subordinate to the jurisdiction of whether 
the territorial or the nationality state, whose competence takes precedence over that of 
the prosecuting state.  
The principle as its proponents advocate stands at loggerheads with the notion of state 
sovereignty and that could not be mended by the implausible argument of imperative 
law. 
As such, the thesis will in the following seek to verify the principle’s acceptance and 
legitimacy in its own right, by examining whether it can be invoked as a free-standing 
basis, in a given case, where there exists no other ground of jurisdiction. That will be 
conducted by discussing the emergence of the principle followed by the provisions of 
the international conventions. 
 
108  Ibid, para.21. See also the opinion of President Guillaume, ibid 104,para.12. 
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3 The Historical Record of Universal Jurisdiction 
3.1 Background 
 
The majority of scholars use a standard formula to explain the provenance and 
development of universal jurisdiction; it starts with an analogy to piracy, followed by 
citing various trials of world-war criminals in international and municipal tribunals. 
 
For its importance as a precedent and as being the only offence subject to universal 
jurisdiction by virtue of multilateral convention, piracy will be analyzed at some length. 
Thereafter, the research will view the trials frequently cited as precedents and 
justification for the expansion of the universality principle to find if the extension of its 
application to human rights crimes can be sustained on these basis. 
 
3.2 The piracy analogy 
 
Universal jurisdiction emerged in the context of piracy which state practice has 
recognized as universally cognizable and empowered every state to capture and 
prosecute pirates who happen to fall under its authority. This practice was restated in 
article 105 of the Convention on the High Seas which stipulates that:  
“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, every state 
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under control of pirates, 
and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the state which 
carried out the seizure may decide upon penalties to be imposed, and may also 
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determine the action to be taken with regard to the ship, aircraft or property, subject to 
the rights of third parties acting in good faith109”. 
 
Scholars and courts have sought to establish the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction by 
invoking piracy as the historical precedent and justification for the principle’s extension 
to modern international crimes by maintaining that the notion of sovereignty has long 
co-existed with universal jurisdiction110. 
 
 This argument was first utilized by The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals for the lack of 
precedents. In1961The Israeli Supreme Court discussed and attached a great importance 
to the piracy as a precedent in the Eichmann trial, it stated that: 
“[t]he basic reason for which international law recognizes the right of each state to 
exercise such jurisdiction “universal” in piracy offences […] applies with even greater 
force to the above-mentioned crimes ‘crimes against humanity.”111  
 
This analogy overlooks the peculiarities of piracy that have made it subject of universal 
jurisdiction; those traits rendered the prosecution of pirates by any state consistent with 
the fundamental principle of state sovereignty. In contrast, human rights related crimes 
do not have some or all those characteristics and thereby the analogy to piracy appears 
to be flawed as it will be set out hereunder. 
 
109 Convention on the High Seas, 10 Dec, 1982, available at: 
www.un.org/Depts/los/conventions_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm, (last visited April .03,2006) 
110 Randall, ibid, 12, stated that “The concept of universal jurisdiction over piracy has had enduring value, 
by supporting the extension of universal jurisdiction to certain modern offences somewhat resembling 
piracy” p.798and that “[T]he legitimacy of extending universal jurisdiction over the Axis offences 
logically may depend upon the strength of the analogy between those offences and piracy”.P.803. 
111  Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann,36 I.L.R. 277,299,304 (Isr.S.Ct. 1962). 
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3.2.1 Why piracy was accepted as an exception to the 
traditional jurisdictional bases. 
3.2.1.1 The lack of state authorization     
           Article 101(1) of the Convention on the High Seas defines piracy as “Any illegal 
act of violence, detention or any act of depredation committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship in a private aircraft.” 
 
The decisive factor is not that pirates conducted their crimes as private actors, but that 
they often acted against the interest of their own state of nationality and thereby, 
purposely waived its protection. 
Pirates in their heydays could easily legalize their business and secure the interference 
and protection of their home state by applying for a writ of marque and became a 
privateer authorized to attack and seize civilian ships on the high seas with the only 
pledge of not to attack the ships of their home state and to share the proceeds with its 
authority. 
 In cases of piracy the ‘victim’ state whose vessels, nationals or interest had been 
harmed by the crime would had no opportunity to attain reparation since pirates acted 
for private ends and no state could be held responsible for their crimes, by the same 
token, the prosecuting of pirates would not violate any other state’s sovereignty since 
they were acting without sovereign authorization. 
 
The situation is completely different in the case of international crimes which are 
invariably conducted by public officials, or at least with their connivance or 
acquiescence, and in this respect their state would incur the responsibility for their 
crimes. Therefore their prosecution could be established on one of the traditional 
jurisdictional bases, either by their own national state or by the national state of the 
victims or by the state in whose territory the alleged crimes took place. 
 
For this particular reason the piracy has been accepted as a apposite subject for the 
application of universal jurisdiction because it excluded state’s political conduct from 
its purport and as result its application could not endanger inter-state relations, this 
particular paradigmatic rational does not apply to the crimes to which universality 
advocates seek to extent.   
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3.2.1.2 The odiousness of piracy 
The piracy analogy is fundamentally predicated on the assumption that universal 
jurisdiction over piracy has been based on its heinousness, and suggests that 
international law has always recognized as an exception to standard jurisdictional bases, 
the prosecution of outrageous crimes. Thus, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide which are egregiously heinous would be legitimately subject to this principle 
and thereby universally cognizable112. 
  
The history of piracy shows that the crime was never regarded as extraordinarily 
heinous because states have accepted as legal enterprise the same acts of the pirate when 
those acts were conducted by a privateer and international law recognized the right of 
every sovereign to authorize this type of approved plundering and states respected the 
system by not interfering and prosecuting each other’s privateers when they acted in the 
high seas, so the kind of revulsion attached to piracy is different from that of modern 
international crimes which are absolutely egregious and unjustifiable. 
 
3.2.1.3 The locus delecti 
The majority of scholars emphasize the importance of the high seas locus in establishing 
universal jurisdiction over piracy113. They argue that since no state has jurisdiction over 
international waters, traditional grounds of jurisdiction do not apply and universal 
jurisdiction becomes necessary tool to fill in this unique legal vacuum.  
 
112  Randall, ibid 12, p 193 maintained that the sole rational for the universal jurisdiction is the 
fundamental nature of the crime.p.193, he cited the Second Circuit’s statement in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
which involved acts of torture in Paraguay by one Paraguayan against another, the court ruled that “[T]he 
torturer has become- like the pirate and slave trader before him- hostis humani generic, an enemy of all 
mankind’630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir.1980). 
113  Anthony Summers “The Under-Theorized Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on 
Trials of War Criminals By National Courts” he opined that “[ n]ations predicate their formulation of 
universal jurisdiction over piracy on the notion that the crime usually committed in terra nullius such as 
on the high seas where no nation exercised territorial control.” 21 Berkely J.Int’l L. (2003).p126. 
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The flaw in this account is that irrespective of where its place of commission, piracy 
harms ships that falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the flag state, and both the 
pirates themselves and their victims could have been within the jurisdiction of their 
national state.  
 
The real problem was not the jurisdictional status of the high seas as a place of 
commission but the fact that no state had on the spot control due to the vastness of the 
seas that rendered piracy as such an easy crime to commit and to escape114. These 
factors necessitated the exclusive jurisdictional treatment of the crime. Therefore, the 
universal jurisdiction over piracy was a useful concept because it was used as an 
evidentiary rule to facilitate the proof of jurisdiction in cases where the forum state had 
substantial connection to the crime. 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the exercise of jurisdiction by states over pirates 
belongs to the category of territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial 
events115. That is supported by state practice which recorded only three cases of 
jurisdiction over accused pirates being exercised in the absence of a link to some 
territorial basis for jurisdiction other than universal jurisdiction since 1705.116 
   
Yet the new universal jurisdiction does not use the universal jurisdiction principle as 
merely an evidentiary rule, but it seeks to apply it specifically where there is no nexus 
and in cases that do not share the core features that made piracy suitable for universal 
jurisdiction.117’  
 
114  E. Kantorovich, Positive Theory of Universal Jurisdiction, 80, Notre Dame L. Rev Nov (2004) p.7. 
115  A. Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried For International Crimes? Some Comments on 
the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 AJIL.853 (Sep 2002).p. 857. The same opinion was expressed by Grotius, 
he wrote that “[t]he flag state should be able to exercise its jurisdiction over non-national ships and 
persons for acts of piracy. It was not application of universal jurisdiction, but it could be said that it was 
recognition of the universal application of the flag state’s jurisdiction”. Cited in Bassiouni, ibid 50,p.109. 
116  A .Rubin, The Law of Piracy (2ed 1998).p.345. 
117  Kantorovich, ibid, 114.p.7. 
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3.3 The Post-War Tribunals 
 
Some post-Second World War trials are extensively cited as the first modern precedents 
of the exercise of universal jurisdiction and as an authoritative justification of its 
application to international crimes118. 
 
3.3.1 International Tribunals 
3.3.1.1 The International Military Tribunal 
The Nuremberg Tribunal (IMT) was created by the London Agreement to try the major 
war criminals for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Its 
Charter and judgment were unanimously reaffirmed by The UNGA119and endorsed by 
the UNSG  in 1949. he stated that: 
“[i]t is possible and perhaps[…] probable, that the [IMT] considered the crimes under 
the charter to be, as international crimes, subject to the jurisdiction of every state.”120 
 
The IMT usually referred to other basis of jurisdiction, but in the Judgement one 
ambiguous reference to universal jurisdiction was made: 
“The signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and 
made regulations for the proper conduct of the trial. In doing so, they have done what 
any one of them might have done singly: for it is not to be doubted that any nation has 
the right to set up special courts to administer law”.121  
 
118  The Sixth Circuit court in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, ruled that “It is generally agreed that the 
establishment of these tribunals and their proceedings were based on universal jurisdiction” 776 F.2d 571, 
582(6th Cir.1985), cited in Randall, ibid 12.p.505. 
119  Principles of international law recognized by the charter of Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgement of 
the tribunal.” G.A.Res.95.UN.Doc.A/64/Add.1,at 188(1946). 
120 . The Charter and Judgement of The Nuremberg Tribunals 80,UN.Doc.A/CN.4/5,UN.Sales No.1949 
V.7(1949) (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General). 
121  IMT Judgment and Sentences, Oct 1, 1946, reprinted in 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 216-17 (1946) . 
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Many commentators122 relied on this single passage to claim that universal jurisdiction 
may be inferred from the words ‘any nation’ which they interpret as giving every nation 
even in absence of any nexus to the crimes, the right to prosecute international crimes, 
and they regard the general assembly resolution as a codification of the jurisdictional 
rights of all states to prosecute the crimes enumerated in the IMT charter. 
 
This presumption does not comport with the history of the tribunal, despite its vague 
reference to universal jurisdiction, the tribunal was established by the Allies who had 
taken the sovereign authorities of Germany. This transfer of sovereignty was explicitly 
recognized in the Berlin Declaration where the Allies: 
 “[a]ssume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers 
possessed by the German Government, The Command and any state, municipal, or local 
government or authority.”123 
 Thereby, the trials were an exercise of national jurisdiction; this view was confirmed in 
the judgment: 
“[t]he making of the Charter [establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal] was the exercise of 
the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich 
unconditionally surrendered: and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for 
the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world”.124 
 
3.3.1.2 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
The consent of the Japanese Government constituted the jurisdictional basis for the 
IMTFE, because unlike in Germany the Allies recognized the Japanese government to 
remain in power as the formal authority over the Japanese territory. They proclaimed 
their intention to bring to trial the Japanese war criminals in the Potsdam Declaration: 
 
122  Michael Scharf, ibid 16, considered the resolution as “[c]odifing the jurisdictional right of all states to 
prosecute the offences addressed by the IMT, namely war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and the 
crime of aggression.” P.371. 
123  Berlin Declaration, June 5.1945,stat.1649,1650 
124  IMT Judgment, at 218. 
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“[w]e do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a 
nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals”125 
The proclamation was unconditionally accepted by the government which undertook to 
“We hereby under take to[…]carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in 
good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by 
the Supreme Commander for the Allies Powers[…]for the purpose of giving effect to 
that Declaration”126  
If this so, it becomes clear that the court did not assert universal jurisdiction, rather its 
jurisdiction was consented to by the Japanese government.  
 
3.3.2 National courts 
 
The Allies tried under the Control Council Law No10 (Dec 20, 1945) non- major 
criminals by tribunals established and administrated by each of them in its respective 
territorial zone and they declared in the preamble of the London Agreement that:  
“[t]he Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 on German atrocities in Occupied 
Europe stated that German officers and men [ ]who have been responsible for or have 
taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent back to the countries in 
which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished 
according to the laws of these liberated countries.”127  
  
By and large, the prosecutions were an exercise of the belligerents’ right to punish the 
conquered belligerents; this fact was expressed by the American Military Tribunal in the 
Alstoetter case when it treated the question of universality. It declared that: 
 
125  Potsdam Declaration: A Statement of Terms for the Unconditional Surrender of Japan, July 26,1945 
available online at www.oxfordjapan.org/documents/postdam_declaration.html (Last visited 
10.01.2006). 
126 . The First Instrument of Surrender, Tokyo Bay on the 2ed, Sep.1945. Available at: 
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/j4.htm. (last visited (07.06.2006). 
127 . Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis. 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945 reprinted in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory ‘War Crimes in 
International Law’ .p.379. 
 43
                                                
“This universality and superiority of international law does not necessarily imply 
universality of its enforcement. As to the punishment of persons guilty of violating the 
laws and customs of war, it has always been recognized that tribunals may be 
established and punishment imposed by the state into whose hands the perpetrator fall. 
The rules of international law recognized as paramount and jurisdiction to enforce them 
by the injured belligerent government, whether within the territorial boundaries of the 
state or in occupied territory, have been unquestioned”128  
 
The prosecutions were conducted by the victorious belligerents or by the courts of the 
affected states by virtue of either the passive nationality or territorial jurisdiction129. 
Therefore, the courts did not feel the necessity to elaborate on the issue in their 
reasoning since they were exercising a traditional jurisdiction.130. 
 
128  The American Military Tribunal (1947). 14 NN.Dig.278,282-83.  
129 . Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences,, considered that “The post-Second World War trials usually cited as 
examples of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in fact do not deserve this label.” 23 Hum. Rts. Q 
(2001).p.942. 
130  Bowett, ibid.34,p.12.  See also the authoritative History of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission and Development of the Laws of War, Complied by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission (London, 1948,at29). “[t]he right of the belligerent to punish as war criminals persons who 
violate the laws or customs of war is a well-recognized principle of international law. It is the right of 
which a belligerent may effectively avail himself during the war in cases when such offenders fall into his 
hands, or after he has occupied all or part of enemy territory and is thus in the position to seize war 
criminals who happen to be there[..] And although the Treaty of Peace brings to an end the right to 
prosecute war criminals, no rule of international law prevents the victorious belligerent from imposing 
upon the defeated state the obligation, as one of the provisions of the armistice or the Peace Treaty, to 
surrender for trial persons accused of war crimes.” Cited in A. Cassese, ibid 36.P.39. 
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3.4 The Trial of Adolf Eichmann  
 
Eichmann was the responsible officer for the execution of the “Final Solution to the 
Jewish Problem”. He fled Germany and settled in Argentina where he was abducted by 
the Israeli Government to stand trial in Jerusalem in 1961. 
He was accused under the Israeli Nazis and Nazis Collaborators (punishment)Act, law, 
for crimes against the Jewish people’ genocide’, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. The crimes were committed before the creation of Israel in 1948. 
 
The case was an evident exercise of the passive nationality and protective jurisdiction 
principles as they were expressed by the District Court of Jerusalem. It stated that: 
“[i]f an effective link existed between the state of Israel and the Jewish people, then a 
crime intended to exterminate the Jewish people has an indubitable connection with the 
state of Israel. The connection between the state of Israel and the Jewish people needs 
no explanation. The state of Israel was established and recognized as the state of the 
Jews.”131   
 
In addition, Eichmann’s defence counsel contented that according to the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle, Israel was obliged to follow the course of extraditing him to 
Germany. By not doing so, Israeli had no right to try him. In addressing that the 
Supreme Court argued that the Government of West Germany refused the Appellant’s 
demand to be extradited to it, and therefore, an offer by the Government of Israel could 
be of no practical use.132  
 
131  Eichmann case,at 52. Available at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann_adolf/transcripts/. (Last visited (10.01.2006). 
132  Ibid, The Israeli Supreme Court, at 12 (12).  
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It considered that the German Government by refusing the extradition demand had, as 
matter of actual fact, consented to the trial in Israel and that could be interpreted as a 
waiver of whatever contentions it could bring against the jurisdiction.133.  
 
Thus, the universality principle was not the sole or the basic ground for the Israeli 
courts’ competence, because that was premised on a set of grounds including two 
traditional bases. Therefore, the trial loses its value as a precedent of the principle’s 
application134.  
 
3.5   Conclusion 
The universality principle has emerged and still applicable for piracy as a permissive 
evidentiary rule to confirm already existing territorial or nationality jurisdiction, but 
even as such it has been rarely practiced. This special jurisdictional treatment is justified 
by reasons related to the constitutive traits of piracy as such, which modern 
international crimes by their very own nature do not possess. This renders the subjection 
of the latter crimes to universal jurisdiction unsuitable and problematic. Therefore, it 
appears safe to declare the piracy analogy as inherently flawed and insufficient to 
sustain the argument of its proponents. 
The post-war and Eichmann trials could not be and was not an exercise of universal 
jurisdiction. 
 
In conclusion, these claimed precedents do not provide a tangible evidence for assuming 
that the principle had been exercised and extended to other crimes than piracy, in order 
to contend its legitimacy as customary international norm. 
 
133  Ibid, stated that there is a “Limitation upon the exercise of universal jurisdiction […] namely that the 
state in which has apprehended the offender must first offer to extradite him to the state in which the 
crime was committed [is] implicit in the maxim aut dedere aut punier” p.302. 
134  Bowett, ibid 34, considered the trial as highly unusual and probably unfounded.p.12. 
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4 International crimes and state practice 
 
To determine whether the universality principle has been accepted and exercised, one 
has to examine the penal repression provisions of international criminal law conventions 
and how states interpret and apply those particular provisions. 
  
4.1 Genocide 
The text of Article VI of the Genocide Convention limits the jurisdictional competence 
to the territorial state or an international tribunal135and explicitly rejects the universality 
principle. 
 
Despite this plain language, some commentators136 and national courts have argued that 
states are permitted or even requested to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime. 
To vindicate this argument some national courts have expressed the following 
contentions:  
(i) Article VI regulation is not exhaustive because even if it does not mention other 
traditional jurisdictional grounds such as the active and passive nationality, it does not 
bar the right of any state to bring to trial before its own tribunals any perpetrator of 
 
135  Article VI provides that ”Persons charged with genocide or any other acts enumerated in article V 
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the acts was committed, or by 
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which 
shall have accepted its jurisdiction”. 
136  Ad hoc judge Lauterpacht expressed this view that “genocide as an international crime permits 
parties within their domestic laws to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime”. Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Reports 1993, at 443. In the 
same case Judge Kreca opined that the convention “does not contain the principle of universal 
jurisdiction.”.at.464. 
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genocide committed by or against its nationals, thus, in a similar manner states are 
entitled to practice the universal jurisdiction even if the convention is silent on that. 
The Spanish Audiencia Nacional adopted this view to justify the assertion of 
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide in the Pinochet case, it incorrectly declared that:  
 
“[i]t would be contrary to the spirit of the convention-which seeks a commitment on the 
part of the Contracting Parties to use their respective criminal justice systems to 
prosecute genocide as a crime under international law, and to prevent impunity in the 
case of such crime”137.   
This interpretation contradicts the wording of the convention which unlike some other 
conventions, it does not permit states to exercise in accordance to their national law any 
other ground of jurisdiction beyond those provided for in the convention138. 
 
(ii) Many courts viewed that in most cases genocide would end up unpunished because 
the perpetrators are usually acting under the colour of state authority and against fellow 
countrymen. Therefore, the territorial state probably would be unwilling to prosecute 
them. This fact renders the assertion of universal jurisdiction a necessary venue to 
achieve the prevention and punishment of genocide. 
This view, though logical, was opposed during the convention’s preparatory works139 , 
and states have continued to reject it even after experiencing the manifest impotence of 
the mechanism adopted in 1948.140  
 
137  Audiencia Nacional ember 1998. quoted in Reydams, ibid 1,p.185.  
138 . For instance the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Article 5 (3), “This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with internal law”.  
139  Wiliam A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, The ‘Crime of Crimes’. 
J.I.C.J.1(2003).p. 42. 
140 Whitaker Report enumerated the following instances of genocide since the entry into force of the 
convention “[t]he Tutsi massacre of Hutu in Burundi in 1965 and 1972, the Paraguayan massacre of Ache 
Indians prior to 1974, the Khmer Rouge massacre in Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978 and the 
contemporary Iranian killing of Bah’is” . Revised and Updated Report on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, study by Mr. Benjamin Whitaker. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1958), at 9-
10. 
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States’ reluctance to accept any form of extraterritorial jurisdiction is evidenced by their 
rejection of the work of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities which appointed a Special Rapporteur to verify whether the 
circumstances were ripened to improve the deficiencies of the convention. 
The Rapporteur suggested that to enhance the convention states are recommended to 
adopt through a revision of the convention or an additional protocol the clause of 
extradite or prosecute, but his judicious proposals were resolutely rejected141. 
 
(iii) The Israeli Supreme Court invoked customary international law to reason its right 
to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide in the Eichmann trial. But it seems 
preposterous to argue that the elements of custom can be present when negotiations 
intended at codification of international obligations, held little more than a decade 
earlier specifically rejected the norm142.  
 
Drawing upon that it is more accurate to conclude that the convention and subsequent 
state practice do not sustain any expansion beyond article VI. 
 
Nevertheless, few states have recently tried persons, domiciled in the prosecuting states, 
allegedly having committed genocide in the Former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Those 
trials are often referred to as a modern exercise of universal jurisdiction over genocide.  
 
The following examples will suffice to prove that those trials were exercise of other 
grounds then the universality principle: 
  
(i) Austria initiated in 1995 Criminal proceedings against a Bosnian Serb, Dusko 
Cvjetokovic for genocide committed in Kucice. To address the suspect’s challenge to 
jurisdiction, the Regional Supreme Court (Linz) and subsequently the Supreme Court of 
Austria held that they are competent under domestic and international law and 
confirmed the applicability of Austria’s vicarious jurisdiction according to the national 
 
141  Ibid. 
142 .Schabas, ibid.139.p.60. 
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Penal Code StGB §65 (1) (2) because the prosecuted acts are criminalized under the 
Austrian and Bosnian law and the extradition of the accused is impossible due to the 
ongoing war in Bosnia Herzegovina.143 Similarly, in the case of Djajic the Bavarian 
Supreme Court based its jurisdiction on the same ground pursuant to the StGB§7 (2) (2) 
which provides of the vicarious jurisdiction.144 
 
(ii) The assertion of jurisdiction was consented to and by the Rwandan and Bosnian 
authorities through their declaration that they had no interest in taking over the 
proceeding and thereby consenting to the jurisdiction of forum state, for instance to the 
German courts in the cases of Jorgic and Djajic.145 
 
(iii) In the Tadic case an examining magistrate invoked the universal jurisdiction 
principle based on the presence of the suspect in Germany as well as other concurrent 
legal circumstances which might be considered as a reliance on the protective principle, 
he held that 
“the crime of adding and abetting genocide coincides in the instant case with other 
serious offences which Germany is obliged to repress on the basis of international 
conventions […] it would inconceivable that Germany, in spite of the allegations and 
the provisions of StGB§6(1), would leave in peace a person who is suspected of having 
committed the worst possible crimes in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and who has 
come voluntarily to Germany.”146 
 
(iv) The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of 
national courts147  and the tribunals have declined to take over and commended trials in 
European countries, for instance in the cases of Djiajic and Jorgic in Germany148, 
 
 
143  The Article provides that “If the offender, though he was a foreigner at the time when he committed 
the offence, was found in this country and if, due to reasons different from the nature and characteristics 
of the offence is not extradited to a foreign state.” Cited in L. Reydams, ibid 1.p.95-6.  
144  Reydams, ibid 1,p.151. 
145  Ibid,p.151-155. 
146  Ibid, p. 150-151. 
147 Article 9 of the ICTY Statute and article 8 of the ICTR Statute. 
148 In Jorgic, the court considered that its competence to adjudicate genocide stems from article 9 of the 
ICTY Statute and not article VI of the Genocide Convention. Institute for International Law, Working 
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Niyonteze in Switzerland149 and in the case of Munyeshyaka in which the Cour de 
Cassation held that the defendant is triable in France by virtue of the French legislation 
implementing the ICTR Statute and in pursuance of the Security Council Resolution 
978 issued on 27 February 1995 which urged states  
“[t]o arrest and detain, in accordance with their national law and relevant standards of 
international law, pending prosecution by the International Tribunal for Rwanda or by 
the appropriate national authorities, persons found within their territory against whom 
there is sufficient evidence that they were responsible for acts within the jurisdiction of 
the International Tribunal of Rwanda”.150 
 
Moreover, Rwandan courts had practiced the death penalty. This obliged the European 
countries to prosecute because extraditing to Rwanda was impossible pursuant to 
Protocol No 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty which forbids 
extradition to countries where the person might face execution.151 
 
. 
4.2 Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
 
The conventions provide for the aut dedere aut judicare enforcement which shall be 
applied as the following: 
“Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged 
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the 
present as defined in the following Article and shall bring such persons regardless of 
their nationality, before its own courts. It may also if it prefers, and in accordance with 
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High 
 
Paper No 87, p. 6. available at: http://law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP87e.pdf (last visited 
12/06/2006) 
149  Reydams,p.201. 
150  Ibid,138. 
151  Ibid,p.133-134. 
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Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a 
prima facie152.  
. 
Some maintain that by not requiring a nationality or territorial link to the prosecuting 
state, the provisions provide for universal jurisdiction, or at least they cannot be 
interpreted a contrario so as to exclude a voluntary exercise of universal jurisdiction.153 
Others interpret states’ agreement to enact the necessary legislation for effective 
domestic jurisdiction as recognition of the parties’ expansion of the conventions 
enforcement form.154    
 
Such views are inaccurate because the text limits the right to prosecute to the state 
where the suspect is found and to interested state which will be the injured state or the 
home country of the accused and it does not create any obligation to search, arrest and 
prosecute in the case where the offender is not present in the prosecuting state. 
 
Further, the obligation imposed on all parties to enact municipal legislations so as to 
make grave breaches of the conventions punishable is not the assertion of universal 
jurisdiction, but merely the provision of the legislative basis for jurisdiction in the event 
that the contracting party is concerned which means its involvement in hostilities as a 
belligerent.155  
 
Moreover, as for the non-existence of case law, it is doubtful whether a neutral state-
party is entitled to request the extradition and the prosecution of a suspect. The 
prosecutions of present Serbs or Rwandans in Germany, France, Denmark, Netherlands 
and Austria did not involve an extradition request from unconcerned states. 
  
 
152  Articles number 49, 50, 129, 146 in the four conventions respectively and 85.1,86.1 Additional 
Protocol I. 
153  Randall, ibid 12.p.816l. 
154  Collen Enache –Brown and Ari Fried, Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty: The Obligation of Aut 
Dedere Aut Judicare in International Law. 43. McGill,L.J (1998).p 622. 
155  Bowett, ibid 34.p.12. 
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In the arrest warrant case Belgium charged Mr Yerodia with grave breaches and crimes 
against humanity without claiming that the 1949 conventions provided it with 
jurisdiction to judge the accused and. Neither did it argue that the Congo, as a party to 
conventions, was obligated to extradite or prosecute. Belgium considered the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction under the conventions as an option and not an obligation. 
 
4.3 Crimes against Humanity 
There is no specialized convention on the crimes; there are only two non-binding 
instruments: 
First, the General Assembly resolution 3074 of December 1973.156 
 
Second, the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 1996, which suggests that states should establish their 
jurisdiction, extradite or prosecute, over crimes against humanity. In the Javor case the 
Cour d’Appel declined jurisdiction over crimes against humanity committed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and rejected the application of the General Assembly resolution because it 
did not contain any role of universal jurisdiction157. 
 
The judicial practice in all the states suggests, except for Belgium before the 
amendment of its 1993/99 law, they have confined their jurisdiction over the crime to 
territorial , protective or passive jurisdictional grounds. 
 
156   Ibid 67. 
157   Benavides, ibid.26.p.66-7. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The debate over the universal jurisdiction has been revitalized by the creation and 
practise of the international tribunals which spurred states to activate already existing 
penal provisions of the various international conventions and to exercise accordingly 
their criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially.  
  
None of the international conventions provide for universal jurisdiction, they instead 
confer the right to assert jurisdiction on the forum state. When exercising its jurisdiction 
the forum state is discharging a treaty obligation, and its competence is based on the 
prior consent of the other parties which by virtue of their ratification have delegated 
their respective competence to the forum state. Therefore, this form of jurisdiction is 
ought to be distinguished from the universality principle.  
Moreover, the prosecution of a present alien may not be universal even where the 
exercise of extradite or try is not premised on a treaty but is consented to by the 
territorial or the nationality state. 
Nonetheless, shall a state decide to exercise the extradite or try mechanism without 
being obliged to so act by a treaty and absent the consent of the state that possesses the 
strongest connection to the offence, still it is more plausible to consider its competence 
as being derivative of either its territorial jurisdiction because it has a substantial 
connection to the alleged crime, or the nationality principle due to the fact that by 
choosing to domicile in that particular state the alleged criminal is actually submitting 
himself to its laws. In all cases when extradition fails, the forum state could prosecute 
pursuant to its undeniable right as a sovereign to protect its vital interests such as 
security, legal order and sense of justice from the potential threats which the presence of 
international criminals entail. 
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In the light of the foregoing, it becomes obvious that in most cases the prosecution of 
international crimes based on the alleged universal jurisdiction can be legitimized by 
applying traditional grounds of jurisdictions.   
. 
The paper has demonstrated that the debate has been more of theoretical than practical 
concern because states tend to prosecute only when their own interests are at steak and 
pursuant to traditional grounds of jurisdiction. 
Henceforth, universal jurisdiction has concordantly been used by national courts, in the 
majority of states, in conjunction with the jus cogens argument only as a humanitarian 
rhetoric to supplement already existed and uncontested classical jurisdiction, for 
instance the Eichmann Case. 
 
The Belgian legislation and practice constituted the only instance of universal 
jurisdiction in cases where the alleged criminal was not present and the crimes had no 
nexus with the state. Belgium had to gave-in to the political pressure of the suspects’ 
national states and in august 2003 it amended its laws and curtailed the reach of its 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, it appears very doubtful that any state will follow the Belgian 
experiment in the future. 
 
In the Arrest Warrant Case, absent an international treaty regulating the issue of 
immunity of foreign ministers, the ICJ deduced from the non-existence of states practice 
or opinion juris necessitates, that the prosecution of foreign ministers is illegitimate 
even when they are accused of perpetrating international crimes. 
 
By applying the same logical method to universal jurisdiction, it is warranted to 
conclude that states’ refusal to adopt the principle in the international conventions and 
the lack of consistent judicial practice are sufficient to maintain that universal 
jurisdiction has not been accepted as an established principle of jurisdiction and that it is 
more plausible to view it as a proposal. 
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